

Transitions in Programming Models

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Significant Transitions

- **Programming languages (PLs)**
 - They evolve slowly and occasionally, e.g.:
 - C to C++ : More robust data structures (objects)
 - C++ to Java : More robust control flows (strong typing)
 - But new *programming models* are invented routinely
 - As domain-specific libraries or API's
 - As program analysis tools
 - As language extensions
- **Transitions**
 - Significant transitions in programming models eventually "precipitate" into new programming languages (unpredictably)
 - We can watch out for significant transitions in programming models

Transitions in 3 (related) areas

- We are in the middle of a radical transition in programming models (and eventually PLs)
- A new emphasis on computation on WANs
 - Wide area flows
 - Messages nor RPC, schedules not threads. *Messaging API's.*
 - Need to integrate these new flows into PL control constructs.
 - Wide area data
 - XML is "net data". *XML API's.*
 - Need to integrate this new data into PL data structures.
 - Wide area protection
 - Access control, data protection. *Security and privacy API's.*
 - Need to integrate security properties into PL assertions.
- Disruptive transitions
 - Forget RPC (and threads): the world is asynchronous.
 - Forget type systems as we know them.
 - Forget trusting anything non-local.

Flow Integration

- **Wish:** Wouldn't it be nice to hide concurrency from programmers?
 - SQL does it well
 - UI packages do it fine (mostly single-threaded!)
 - RPC does it ok
 - But we are moving towards more asynchrony, I.e. towards more visible concurrency (e-commerce scripts and languages, web services, etc.)
 - You can hide all concurrency some of the time, and you can hide some concurrency all the time, but you can't hide all concurrency all the time.*
 - Asynchronous message-based concurrency does not fit easily with more traditional **shared-memory** synchronous concurrency control
- **Goal:** make concurrent flows available and checkable at the language level.

Data Integration

- **Wish:** Wouldn't it be nice to "program directly against the schema" in a well-typed way?
 - PL data has traditionally been "triangular" (trees), while persistent data has traditionally been "square" (tables)
 - This has caused integration problems: the "impedance mismatch" in data base programming languages
 - Now, persistent data (XML) is triangular too!
 - However, the type systems for PL data (based on tree matching) and XML (based on tree automata) are still deeply incompatible
- **Goal:** make semistructured data easily available and checkable at the language level.

Protection Integration

- **Wish: Wouldn't it be nice to have automatic security?**
 - It's an applet. Sits in a sandbox. End of story. (?)
 - Ok, what about *semi-automatic* security? Explicitly grant/require permissions. (Stack walking etc.)
 - Leads to "sophisticated" access models that programmers do not understand reliably.
- **Security today: obscure mechanisms to prevent *something* from happening.**
 - It is usually not clear what security mechanisms are meant to *achieve*.
 - Need to move towards *declarative* security and privacy interfaces and policies.
- **Goal: make protection policies available and checkable at the language level.**

Language Reliability

- Whether or not we merge new programming models into PLs, we need analysis tools for these new situations
 - Flow: e.g.: behavioral type/analysis system
 - "Does the program respect the protocol?"
 - Data: e.g.: semistructured type/analysis systems
 - "Does the program output match the schema?"
 - Protection: e.g.: information-flow type/analysis system
 - "Does the program defy policy or leak secrets"
- Analysis tools are critical for software reliability
 - Getting it right without assistance is just too hard.
 - These technologies need to be developed in any case, and is better if they can be incorporated in programming languages.

A Personal Agenda

- **Flows** [exploit join calculus]
 - Synchronization chords
 - **C ω** (f.k.a. Polyphonic C#)
- **Data** [exploit spatial logics as types]
 - Description logics
 - **C ω** (f.k.a. Xen/X#)
- **Protection** [exploit π -calculus-style restriction]
 - Flows: Secrecy and Group Creation
 - Data: Trees with hidden labels

Flows

Language Support for (WAN) Distribution

- Distribution
 - ⇒ concurrency + latency
 - ⇒ asynchrony
 - ⇒ more concurrency
 - Approaches: Message-passing, event-based programming, dataflow models, etc.
 - Languages: coordination (orchestration) languages, workflow languages, etc.
- Good language support for asynchrony
 - Make invariants and intentions more apparent (part of the interface), because:
 - It's good software engineering
 - Allows the compiler much more freedom to choose different implementations
 - Also helps other tools

C ω Flows

- An extension of the C# language with new concurrency constructs
- Based on the join calculus
 - A foundational process calculus like the π -calculus but better suited to asynchronous, distributed systems.
 - First applied to functional languages (JoCaml).
 - It adapts remarkably well to o-o classes and methods.
- A single model that works for
 - Local concurrency (multiple threads on a single machine).
 - Distributed concurrency (asynchronous messaging over LAN or WAN).
 - With no distributed consensus.
- It an unusual model. But it's also a simple extension of familiar o-o notions.
 - No threads, no locks, no fork, only *join*.

In one slide:

- **Client Side (method invocation)**
 - Objects have both synchronous and *asynchronous* methods.
 - If the method is synchronous, the caller blocks until the method returns some result (as usual).
 - If the method is async, the call completes at once and returns void (as in message passing).
- **Server Side (class definition)**
 - A class defines a collection of *chords* (method synchronization patterns), which define what happens once a particular *set* of methods have been invoked. One method may appear in several chords.
 - When enough pending method calls match a chord pattern, the chord body runs. If there are several matches, an unspecified chord is selected.
 - Each chord can have *at most* one synchronous method (providing the *result*). A chord containing *only* asynchronous methods effectively forks a new thread.

A simple unbounded buffer

```
class Buffer {  
    String get() & async put(String s) {  
        return s;  
    }  
}
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- An asynchronous method header (hence returning no result), with a string argument

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```

- An ordinary (synchronous) method header with no arguments, returning a string
- An asynchronous method header (hence returning no result), with a string argument
- Joined together in a chord with a single body

A simple unbounded buffer

```
class Buffer {  
    String get() & async put(String s) {  
        return s;  
    }  
}
```

- Calls to put() return immediately (but are internally queued if there's no waiting get()).
- Calls to get() block until/unless there's a matching put()
- When there's a match the body runs, returning the argument of the put() to the caller of get().
- Exactly which pairs of calls are matched up is unspecified.

A simple unbounded buffer

```
class Buffer {  
    String get() & async put(String s) {  
        return s;  
    }  
}
```

- Does this example involve spawning any threads?
 - No. Though the calls will usually come from different pre-existing threads.
- So is it thread-safe? You don't seem to have locked anything...
 - Yes. The chord compiles into code which uses locks. (And that *doesn't* mean everything is synchronized on the object.)
- Which method gets the returned result?
 - The synchronous one. And there can be at most one of those in a chord.

Reader/Writer

...using threads and mutexes in Modula 3

[An introduction to programming with threads.](#)

Andrew D. Birrell, January 1989.

```
VAR i: INTEGER;  
VAR m: Thread.Mutex;  
VAR c: Thread.Condition;
```

```
PROCEDURE AcquireExclusive();  
BEGIN  
  LOCK m DO  
    WHILE i # 0 DO Thread.Wait(m,c) END;  
    i := -1;  
  END;  
END AcquireExclusive;
```

```
PROCEDURE AcquireShared();  
BEGIN  
  LOCK m DO  
    WHILE i < 0 DO Thread.Wait(m,c) END;  
    i := i+1;  
  END;  
END AcquireShared;
```

```
PROCEDURE ReleaseExclusive();  
BEGIN  
  LOCK m DO  
    i := 0; Thread.Broadcast(c);  
  END;  
END ReleaseExclusive;
```

```
PROCEDURE ReleaseShared();  
BEGIN  
  LOCK m DO  
    i := i-1;  
    IF i = 0 THEN Thread.Signal(c) END;  
  END;  
END ReleaseShared;
```

An integer i represents the lock state:

-1 \leftrightarrow **0** \leftrightarrow **1** \leftrightarrow **2** \leftrightarrow **3** ...
(exclusive) (available) (shared)

Reader/Writer in five chords

```
public class ReaderWriter {
    private async Idle();

    public void AcquireExclusive() & Idle() {}
    public void ReleaseExclusive() { Idle(); }

    public void AcquireShared() & Idle() { S(1); }
    public void AcquireShared() & async S(int n) { S(n+1); }
    public void ReleaseShared() & async S(int n) {
        if (n == 1) Idle(); else S(n-1);
    }

    public ReaderWriter() { Idle(); }
}
```

A single private message represents the state:

$none \leftrightarrow Idle() \leftrightarrow S(1) \leftrightarrow S(2) \leftrightarrow S(3) \dots$
(exclusive) (available) (shared)

A pretty transparent description of a simple state machine.
Moreover, the synchronization patterns are apparent in the class interface,

Features

- **A clean, simple, new model for asynchronous concurrency**
 - Minimalist design - to build whatever complex synchronization behaviors you need
 - Easier to express and enforce concurrency invariants; not "buried in the code" any more
 - Much better than programming reactive state machines by hand (the compiler does it for you).
 - Efficiently compiled to queues, automata, match bit-vectors, and thread pools.
 - Compatible with existing constructs, though they constrain our design somewhat
- **More transparently exposes the control flows**
 - Solid foundations, on which to build analysis tools.
 - And checkable notions of *contracts*.

Future Trends


- Protocol contracts
 - Typechecking-style support for checking the interaction of concurrent protocols.
 - A.k.a behavioral type system, session types, etc.
 - Required for software reliability
 - Facilitated by explicit concurrency interfaces.

Data

Data

Abiteboul, Buneman, Suciu:
"Data on the Web"

Semistructured Data
(I.e.: XML after parsing)



- A tree (or graph), unordered (or ordered). With labels on the edges.
- Invented for "flexible" data representation, for quasi-regular data like address books and bibliographies.
- Adopted by the DB community as a solution to the "database merge" problem: merging databases from uncoordinated (web) sources.
- Adopted by W3C as "web data", then by everybody else.

It's Unusual Data

- Not really arrays/lists:
 - Many children with the same label, instead of indexed children.
 - Mixture of repeated and non repeated labels under a node.
- Not really records:
 - Many children with the same label.
 - Missing/additional fields with no tagging information.
- Not really variants (tagged unions):
 - Labeled but untagged unions.
- Unusual data.
 - Yet, it aims to be the new universal standard for interoperability of programming languages, databases, e-commerce...

Needs Unusual Languages

- *New flexible types and schemas are required.*
 - Based on "regular expressions over trees" reviving techniques from tree-automata theory.
- *New processing languages required.*
 - Xduce [Pierce, Hosoya], Cduce, ...
 - Various web scripting abominations.
- *New access methods/query languages required.*
 - E.g. Existence of paths through the tree.

Data Descriptions

- We want to *talk about* data
 - I.e., specify/query/constrain/typecheck the possible structure of data, for many possible reasons:
 - Typing (and typechecking): for language and database use.
 - Constraining (and checking): for policy or integrity use.
 - Querying (and searching): for semistructured database use.
 - Specifying (and verifying): for architecture or design documents.
- A *description (spatial formula)* is a formal way of talking about the possible structure of data.
 - We go after a general framework: a very expressive language of descriptions.
 - Combining logical and structural connectives.
 - Special classes of descriptions can be used as types, schemas, constraints, queries, and specifications.

Example: Typing

Data

```
Cambridge[  
  Eagle[  
    chair[0] |  
    chair[0]  
  ]  
]
```

Description

```
Cambridge[  
  Eagle[  
    chair[0] |  
    T  
  ] | T  
]
```

data matches description

In Cambridge there is (nothing but) a pub called the Eagle that contains (nothing but) two empty chairs.

In Cambridge there is (at least) a pub called the Eagle that contains (at least) one empty chair.

Example: Queries

With match variables \mathcal{X} : *Who is really sitting at the Eagle?*

```
Eagle[  
  chair[ $\neg \mathbf{0} \wedge \mathcal{X}$ ] |  
  T  
]
```

```
Cambridge[  
  Eagle[  
    chair[John[0]] |  
    chair[Mary[0]] |  
    chair[0]  
  ]  
]
```

Yes: $\mathcal{X} = \textit{John}$ [**0**]

Yes: $\mathcal{X} = \textit{Mary}$ [**0**]

With *select-from*:

```
from Eagle[...]  
match Eagle[chair[ $\neg \mathbf{0} \wedge \mathcal{X}$ ] | T]  
select person[ $\mathcal{X}$ ]
```

Single result:

```
person[John[0]] |  
person[Mary[0]]
```

Example: Policies

“Vertical” implications about nesting

“Business Policy”

Borders[
 Starbucks[...] |
 Books[...]
]

Borders[**T**] \Rightarrow
Borders[*Starbucks*[**T**] | **T**]

If it's a Borders,
then it must contain a Starbucks

“Horizontal” implications about proximity

“Social Policy”

Smoker[...] |
NonSmoker[...] |
Smoker[...]

(*NonSmoker*[**T**] | **T**) \Rightarrow
(*Smoker*[**T**] | **T**)

If there is a NonSmoker,
then there must be a Smoker nearby

Example: Schemas

- Spatial formulas are a “very rich type system”. We can comfortably represent various kinds of schemas.
- Ex.: Xduce-like (DTD-like) schemas:

$\mathbf{0}$	the empty tree
$\mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{B}$	an \mathcal{A} next to a \mathcal{B}
$\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}$	either an \mathcal{A} or a \mathcal{B}
$n[\mathcal{A}]$	an edge n leading to an \mathcal{A}
\mathcal{A}^*	$\triangleq \mu X. \mathbf{0} \vee (\mathcal{A} \mid X)$ the merge of zero or more \mathcal{A} s
\mathcal{A}^+	$\triangleq \mathcal{A} \mid \mathcal{A}^*$ the merge of one or more \mathcal{A} s
$\mathcal{A}^?$	$\triangleq \mathbf{0} \vee \mathcal{A}$ zero or one \mathcal{A}


Future Trends

- Freely mixing logical descriptions and data: spatial logics

$$a[b[A \vee B]] \Rightarrow a[C]$$

- Fusion of type systems, query languages, policy specifications, etc.
- Lots of open theoretical problems in this area (typing and subtyping algorithms, decidable sublogics, etc.)

Cw Data



Generalized member access (powerful ".")

Protection


Hiding

- Any kind of security/privacy issue has to do with hiding something
 - Hiding procedures by access control
 - Hiding data by encryption
- In programming languages:
 - How can we protect/hide flows? (Security)
 - How can we protect/hide data? (Privacy)
 - Exploit the mother of all hiding operators:
 π -calculus restriction
(already widely used in crypto protocol analysis).

Data Protection: Trees with Hidden Labels

- Let's take a fundamental data structure (trees) and add a simple notion of hiding.


$P, Q ::=$
 0
 $n[P]$
 $P \mid Q$
 $(\nu n)P$




- E.g.: Compiler AST's with scoping of identifiers.

Tree Equivalence (Structural Congruence)

- $(\nu n)(P \mid (\nu n)Q) \equiv ((\nu n)P) \mid ((\nu n)Q)$





- $(\nu n)m[P] \equiv m[(\nu n)P]$ if $n \neq m$




Ex: Local Pointers

- E.g., XML IDREFs



Data Manipulation with Hidden Labels


- E.g.: Remove all dangling pointers



- See "Manipulating Trees with Hidden Labels" (Cardelli, Gardner, Ghelli), by pattern matching on such trees.

Type Systems for Hidden Names

- $myAccount : \lambda y. \dots id[y] \dots checkbook[y] \dots$



Hiding quantifier

- *These are name-dependent types*
 - Dependent types: traditionally very hard to handle because of computational effects.
 - But dependent only on “pure names”: no computational effects.
 - Name-dependent types are emerging as a general techniques for handling freshness, hiding, protocols (e.g. Vault), and perhaps security/privacy aspects in type systems.
- *As a basis for transformation languages*
 - Well-typed tree transformations that use and generate hidden labels without violating their “anonymity”.

Future Trends


- Hiding as a data structure constructor and as a data type quantifier.

Flow Protection: Group Creation

- *Group creation*
 - Create new (hidden) names, but also:
 - Partition them into separate groups, but also:
 - Hide the groups
- It is a natural extension of type systems developed for the π -calculus:
 - $(vG) (vn:G) (vm:G) \dots$
 - create a new group (i.e., type or collection) G , and populate it with new elements n, m, \dots (e.g. user-id's, cryptokeys).
- *Purpose*
 - A secret like $n:G$ could escape on a public channel of type G accidentally or maliciously.
 - But if restricted by (vG) , then $n:G$ can never escape from the initial scope of G , as a simple matter of typechecking.

Untrusted Opponents

- Problem: opponents cheat. Suppose the opponent is untyped, or not well-typed (e.g.: running on an untrusted machine):



- Will an untyped opponent, by cheating on the type of the public channel p , be able to acquire secret information?
- Fortunately, no. The fact that the player is well-typed is sufficient to ensure secrecy, even in presence of untyped opponents. Essentially because $p(x)$ must be locally well-typed.
- We do not even need to trust the type of the public channel p , obtained from a potentially untrusted name server.

Secrecy Guarantee

- Programmer's reference manual:

Names of group G remain secret, forever, outside the initial scope of (νG) .

- Secrecy Theorem (paraphrased)

If $(\nu G)(\nu x:\dots G\dots)P$ is well-typed, then P will not leak x even to an untyped (untrusted) opponent.

Future Trends

- Programming constructs that help enforce security properties by typechecking or analysis.

Conclusions

WAN Flows, Data, Protection

- **New languages**
 - Language evolution is driven by wishes.
 - Language adoption is driven by needs.
- **We now *badly need* evolution in areas related to WAN-programming for non-experts (i.e. with language support).**
 - Concurrent flows.
 - Applications of Join Calculus.
 - Semistructured data.
 - Applications of Spatial Logics.
 - Flow and data protection.
 - Applications of π -calculus restriction.
- **Why all these calculi/logics/blah things?**
 - Formal methods are no longer a complete luxury, in a new world where we increasingly need to *guarantee* good behavior.

References

- **Flows**

- **Join Calculus**: Fournet *et al.*
- **PolyphonicC#/ C ω** Benton, Cardelli, Fournet.
- **Behave!**: Larus *et al.* **Vault**: DeLine *et al.*
- + Kobayashi, Honda, Yoshida, Vasconcelos, ...

- **Data**

- **Xen/C ω** Meijer, Bierman *et al.*, <http://www.research.microsoft.com/Comega/>
- **TQL**: Cardelli, Ghelli *et al.*

- **Protection**

- **Fresh-ML**: Pitts *et al.*
- **Secrecy and Groups**: Cardelli, Ghelli, Gordon.
- **Trees with Hidden Labels**: Cardelli, Gardner, Ghelli.
- + Type systems for security (many).

www.research.microsoft.com/Comega/